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Abstract  
This article examines the contribution of one Islamic scholar, Fetullah Gu¨len to the debate about 
the meaning and practice of responsibility. It analyses Gu¨len’s thinking in terms of three inter-
connected modes of responsibility: relational accountability (the framework for responsibility), 
moral agency (teleological, virtue focused and action centred) and liability. This view of responsibility 
is contrasted with major western philosophers such as Levinas, Buber and Jonas, Islamic tradition 
and the major views about corporate responsibility, including stakeholder theory. The role of 
dialogue in embodying the three modes of responsibility is then analysed. The social responsibility 
practice of business leaders who are part of Gu¨len’s Hizmet Movement is briefly surveyed to 
illustrate the embodiment of responsibility. This focuses on the contribution of business to 
education and peace building, and includes the example of Zaman Daily.  
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Fethullah Gu¨len  
Barak Obama suggested that the credit crisis reflected a ‘culture of irresponsibility’1 and subsequent 
analyses of the causes of the crisis have raised questions about the meaning and practice of 
responsibility in business (including, Robinson and Dowson 2012; Rayment and Smith 2010; Sun et 
al. 2011; Gregg and Stoner 2009; Visser 2011; Robinson and Smith 2012; Shanks 2012; Pesqueux 
2012; Schumpeter 2009). Many view the crisis as a function of greed, suggesting that responsibility is 
focused in character attributes and ethical virtues (Argandona 2012; Miller 2009). Others have 
argued that the cause of irresponsibility was institutional, suggesting that responsible behaviour is 
affected by the culture of the organisation, the wider industry and the governance of both (Visser 
2011). Others have argued that the cause lies outside business, in different professions and in 
politics, both unable to regulate the behaviour of the finance industry, or work with it to share 
responsibility (Crotty and Epstein 2008). This article considers a contribution of religion to the 
debate about responsibility and business, focusing on the work of the Turkish Islamic scholar 
Fethullah Gu¨len. Gu¨len has focused on the social context of the Islamic faith, without making a 
systematic analysis of the concept of responsibility. Hence this article will draw together aspects of 
his writings and begin to apply them to the debate. The importance of Gu¨len is fourfold. First, in 
many respects he is an orthodox, even conservative, Turkish Islamic thinker (of the Maturidi school), 
so this will resonate with much of Islamic thought. Second, Gu¨len also reflects Sufi thinking in the 
tradition of Said Nursi (Michel 2005), stressing holism which combines a strong affective spirituality 
with reflection on the Qur’an and a concern for action in one’s social context.  
1 http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-5093760-503544.html 
 
 Third, Turkey is very much a bridge between East and West, a capitalist country, with a largely 
Islamic population. Fourth, Gu¨len is the leader of a movement several million strong, and 
associated with the burgeoning middle-class in Turkey, and with business success.2 In the light this, I 
will first examine Gu¨len’s view of responsibility based in three modes of responsibility, noting the 
importance of dialogue to his view. I will then show how this makes a contribution to the idea and 
practice of responsibility, giving a particular example of practice in Zaman Daily. In examining 
Gu¨len’s view of responsibility, I will make use of three inter-connected modes of responsibility (see 
Robinson 2009); the first two of which originate in Aristotle’s thinking (Alexander 2008):  
• Accountability. The person is responsible or answerable to someone. This involves the capacity to 
give an account and an understanding of who is owed this account. 
• Attributability. Actions can be attributed to a person. Hence, the person can be seen have been 
responsible for those actions and the decisions that led to them. This is focused in human agency, 
freedom and the capacity to make decisions (cf. Callender 2010).  
• Liability. The person is responsible for something or someone. The big question then is how broad 
this responsiblity might be. We shall see that Gu¨len advocates universal responsibility.  
Accountability  
Gu¨len’s view of responsibility is grounded in accountability. For Gu¨len, this is focused in the 
relationship with God, based in his creation theology. God created the world and appointed 
humanity to be the vicegerent (Qur’an 2: p. 30). At its heart, this is about stewardship, hence Gu¨len 
refers to human beings as ‘carriers of trust’ (2004, p. 4). Humankind in this sense stands in for God, 
as deputy, but also stands before him, both responsible with God for creation and accountable to 
him for its flourishing. Accountability is then set up in the context of a transcendent relationship of 
trust. Relation-centred accountability contrasts with contract centred accountability which focuses 
on specific targets, and roles that relate to those targets. Relation-centred accountability has a 
different dynamic, aiming to nurture the relationship and respond to the call of the other. The call of 
God in creation, Gu¨len argues, is focused in love, which is ‘the reason for existence and its essence, 
and is the strongest tie that binds creation together’ (quoted in Pratt 2010, p. 198). The 
responsibility of the person or organisation is to work out how to respond in context.  
2 http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/amodernottoman/. Whilst influenced by the Sufi tradition, 
the movement is not a Sufi order. The classical tariqa Sufism would require initiation, and involve esoteric 
religious practices and arcane terminology (C¸ etin 2007, p. 382). This is the opposite of a movement which 
aims for transparency and communication through action. Gulay (2007) notes that Gu¨len also goes against 
the traditionalist Sufi paradigm by playing down the role of a Sufi master as mediator between the disciples 
and God. Gu¨len sees himself as an inspirational leader, but claims no formal authority, preferring to call title 
the movement Hizmet (service), pointing to the infinite wisdom of the Qur’an, and the many different ways of 
accessing that (Gulay 2007, p. 57). 
 
May (1987) refers to this as covenant thinking, something which is based in gift and openness, 
enabling the space for creative response, and community (involving a consciousness and 
responsiveness to the social environment). This contrasts, he argues, with contract thinking which 
sums up obligations in specific terms, including targets, and sees the fulfilment of the contract as 
discharging all accountability. It is possible to polarise covenant and contract thinking (cf. Titmuss 
1973), but there is clear need for both, with covenant suited to high views of the professions, as 
fulfilling a call from an other (Khurana and Nohria 2008) and contract needed to sustain projects. 
There are several elements that make this relational accountability so powerful for Gu¨len and other 
religious writers. First, it is eschatological, offering, a sense of judgment over time. The person will 
have to give an account of actions before another, in religion’s case God, and this will involve 
reflecting on and testing of beliefs, ideas and practice. For Gu¨len the final judgment does not 
involve simplistic or prescriptive judgments on orthodoxy or orthopraxy, but rather a testing that 
fully involves the person reflecting and giving an account, one that links judgement to on-going 
introspection and self-interrogation (Gu¨len 1990a, b; cf. Robinson 2008). This deepens any view of 
transparency, as not being simply about openness but also the capacity to give an account, and thus 
be open to testing (cf. O’Neill 2002). Second, this sets up a perspective of inclusivity. If the person to 
whom one is accountable transcends all interests then the focus of responsibility does not a priori 
exclude any aspect of the social or physical environment. The fulfilment of accountability is then a 
function of being responsive to social context, making it hard for anyone, including businesspersons, 
to predetermine precisely what obligations are owed to which stakeholders. This connects 
accountability to liability (see below). Third, it provides a more effective motivation to practice 
responsibility. Relational accountability engages the affective as well as cognitive aspects of value. 
Transcendent points of value such as principles, or broad concepts such as the common good, are 
important but remain firmly cognitive, without any sense of relational identification. That powerful 
framework of accountability might seem to be difficult to establish outside the religious sphere. 
However, there are other examples of such relational accountability in the philosophical sphere, not 
least Hans Jonas (1984). Focusing on philosophy, though recognising the usefulness of creator myths 
to reinforce the sense of environmental transcendence, Jonas offers a view of the social and physical 
environment over time. This is a recognition of environments whose identity, interest and 
responsibility transcend the individual or organisation, suggesting a level of answerability for all 
actions in relation to these. The voice of God for religious spirituality may seem singular and 
powerful because it is located in a ‘person’, but the wider environment in all its complex relations is 
also relational, and thus like the religious God able to ‘call’ humankind to respond and thus to 
account, to be answerable for our actions. It is perhaps not surprising that this sense of the 
transcendent has led some thinkers to personify the physical environment, as in the Gaia hypothesis 
(Lovelock 1979). The theist approach looks to respond to the care of the creator, built in the singular 
relationship with God. The more philosophical approach looks to the call of future generations, the 
wider environment, with accountability to the next generation. Jonas (2001 p. 269) uses the mythic 
idea of the ‘book of life’ which sets up a timeless seat of justice’—again an eschatological frame. An 
important point in relational accountability, as Jonas (1984) and Levinas (1989) stress, is that it 
provides the basis for a shared morality, without making it prescriptive or totalizing.3  
3 The nature of this accountability is reinforced by Jonas’s negative view of technological man and the 
underlying ‘heuristics of fear’ (1984, p 27), in other words, the danger of technology destroying the 
environment. This, however, is not the basis of the accountability, only a ‘very useful first word’ (ibid.) which 
focuses the mind. In contrast, for Gu¨len, science and technology are means of responding to God’s call. 
Moral Agency  
It is from this relational accountability that Gu¨len draws a second mode of responsibility, 
attributability (Alexander 2008), which in its strongest sense involves moral agency, summed up in 
decision making. Taylor (1989) argues that such decision-making constitutes a strong valuation that 
connects action to deep decision making, and is what constitutes the moral identity of the person. In 
order to be fully responsible, the person would have to be aware of his or her self (including ideas 
and feelings) and social context, the significant relationships, the mutual effect of those relationships 
and so on (Gu¨len 2006). A key issue in this aspect of responsibility is freedom and autonomy. Are 
we free to make such decisions or is our behaviour determined (Callender 2010)? Agency in Gu¨len 
emerges from the framework of accountability. Agency and, with that, personal autonomy is a gift 
from God that enables the person to fulfil the role of khalifa (deputy). This agency gives the person 
freedom to transform society, so long as the source of that freedom and agency is acknowledged. 
God ‘alone determines, apportions, creates, and spreads all out provisions before us’ (Gu¨len 1999, 
p. 94). This then is a mediated agency, a limited form of subjectivity that is, in Vahdat’s words, 
‘projected onto the attributes of monotheistic deity- attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience, 
and volition and then partially reappropriated by humans. In this scheme, human subjectivity is 
contingent on God’s subjectivity. Thus, although human subjectivity is not denied, it is never 
independent of God’s subjectivity, and in this sense, it is mediated’ (Vahdat 2002, p. 134). Such 
agency is teleological, virtue centred, and action centred. Teleology The vicegerent is to fulfil the 
divine purpose. Hence, any sense of response has to be seen in terms of overall sovereignty of God 
and his desire to see humanity fulfilling his plans, to develop humankind and the world as a whole. 
This mode of responsibility, however, is developed in significant ways. The task of the vicegerent is 
not simply to believe in God but also to understand ‘the mysteries within things and the cause of 
natural phenomena, and therefore to be able to interfere in nature’ (Gu¨len 2004a, b, p. 122). The 
term interfere does not denote a dominant relationship to the ecosystem but rather involvement as 
co-creators. In this, humanity is the ‘brightest mirror’ of the Creator, and needs ‘to discover the 
mysteries imbedded in the soul of the universe, to uncover the hidden power, might and potential, 
to use everything to its purpose, and to be the representatives of characteristics that belong to Him, 
such as knowledge will and might’ (Gu¨len 2004a, b, p. 122). Gu¨len takes those who do this to be 
‘genuine human beings’ and argues that they exercise their free will ‘in a constructive manner, 
working with and developing the world, protecting the harmony between existence and humanity, 
reaping the bounties of the Earth and Heavens for the benefit of humanity, trying to raise the hue, 
form and flavour of life to a more humane level within the framework of the Creator’s orders and 
rules’ (Gu¨len 2004a, b, p. 124). This then has a consequentialist element to it, i.e. for the good of 
mankind, but it is also about the very nature of humanity and how this should reflect the creative 
and loving stance of God. There are two implications from this. First, we have to take science 
seriously (building on Nursi’s writings, see Michel 2005; Vicini 2007, p. 435). Science is not something 
which is autonomous or against religion. Rather does science reveal to us the laws of nature and, by  
implication, helps us to see the telos or purpose of creation. Second, the free will that is key to any 
sense of responsibility is exercised in the light of the relationship with the divine, and thus focused in 
service. This aims to sustain the balance between the environment and humanity, making the most 
of the resources given in creation, all for the benefit of humanity as a whole and all with a purpose 
of raising the level of civilization for all. The natural world then can be manipulated for positive ends. 
All this suggests a continual reflection on God’s purpose in context, hence, the need to use science. 
Such a continual reflective process, of course, cannot be simplistic, or even univocal, partly because 
science per se cannot determine the teloi. God’s purposes are a matter of value rather than scientific 
truth. The science may support and confirm that value but cannot ultimately decide the value. In any 
case, any judgement about teloi, or about the scientific support for teloi, will inevitably be 
contested. Hence, there is need for continual debate around the understanding of teloi. The practice 
of vicegerency then becomes essentially social and dialogic (Gu¨len 2004a, b).  
Virtue Centred  
Agency for Gu¨len is based in a holistic and dynamic anthropology that brings together emotion, 
spirit, rationality and action. He sees the seat of power and, with that, agency, in the terms of 
Tawney (1930), as ‘in the soul’. The soul for Gu¨len involves both rationality and more emotion-
based drives (Mohamed 2007, p. 556). This requires the four cardinal virtues of courage, wisdom, 
temperance and justice which moderate lust and anger, leading to a degree of rational self-control, 
focused in ‘natural reason’ (Gu¨len 2002, 2009a, b, p. 207). Such a moral psychology does not see 
agency as a simple assertion of rational thinking but as a continued dynamic, critically handling 
emotional drives and the narratives related to those drives, as well as any rational arguments. This 
form of holism then is not about mystical acceptance but about continual reflection and critical 
testing. Hence, the development of moral character, not simply the capacity for choice, is the core to 
Gu¨len’s view of agency and responsibility. This enables the establishment of personal responsibility 
and from that any approach to corporate or civic responsibility (Toguslu 2007, p. 450). Any 
responsibility is based in universal values such as ‘devotion, simplicity, trust, loyalty, fidelity, humility 
modesty and connectedness’ (ibid. 455). By extension, education is based in the development of 
character, focusing on continual self-criticism and self-renewal. Such self-examination ‘enables the 
believer to make amends for past mistakes and be absolved in the sight of God, for it provides a 
constant realisation of the self-renewal in one’s inner world’ (Gu¨len 1999). In effect, this enables 
the development of responsibility for one’s own thinking and underlying values, and how these are 
embodied in practice. Thus responsibility is directly connected to virtues (cf. Ladd 1991; Williams 
2008). The freedom and sense of agency that is at the heart of this is very different from the liberal 
view of negative freedom (Berlin 1969), freedom from coercion. Gu¨len also has little time for the 
positive freedom that Berlin suggests is found through approaches to equalising opportunities. He is 
much closer to writers such as Novak in his focus on moral freedom (1990). Novak’s idea of moral 
freedom is based in the work of Aquinas, with a stress on gaining self-mastery and ordering the 
passions. This is about the individual developing autonomy and agency through reflective 
deliberative decision making. Agency is precisely gained through the development of the virtues that 
underlie these activities (1990, p. 16). Novak in all of this is primarily concerned about the individual 
taking responsibility for their decisions. It is precisely such freedom that lies at the ‘root of human 
autonomy, responsibility and dignity’ (ibid. 18) all of which enable the individual to act in God’s 
image. Like Gu¨len, Novak see the exercise of personal responsibility as then leading to broader 
social responsibility.  
Action  
At the heart of much of this is a great stress on action. Responsibility demands creative action not 
passive submission. At the core of this is the concept of hizmet that is about the embodying of the 
inner awareness of God in the practice of service. Hence, there is no question of passive pietism; 
‘Those who always feel themselves in the presence of God do not need to seclude themselves from 
people’ (Gu¨len 1995, p. 87). Free will is centred in the context of hizmet, focused on the example of 
the Prophet as a man of action, who stressed learning, trading, agriculture, action and thought. 
Moreover, he ‘encouraged his people to do perfectly what he did, and condemned inaction and 
begging’ (Gu¨len 1995, p. 105). The motivation for this action is not salvation but rather to please 
God, ‘thinking only of his approval in everyday speech, behaviour and thought’ (Gu¨len 2004b, p. 6). 
Hence, intention is critical to the practice of responsibility.4 The person is engaged without ceasing 
in particular and focused activity, always asking ‘Oh my Lord, what else can I do?’. Hence, Gu¨len 
stresses the importance of good time management and well-planned activity, all part of what it 
means to be responsible. The more that such responsibility is practised in all contexts, the more that 
this leads to increased responsibility; ‘more blessings mean more responsibility’ (Gu¨len 2000, p. 
133). Agency in all this is relational, not focused purely in the individual, but part and parcel of 
continued interaction with the social network. This strongly parallels Niebuhr’s view of 
responsibility, ‘What is implicit in the idea of responsibility is the image of man-the answerer, man 
engaged in dialogue, man acting in response to action upon him’ (1963, p. 56). For Gu¨len 
humankind cannot stand outside, and has to assert responsibility within that relational framework, 
precisely to avoid a loss of agency. He writes, ‘Remaining aloof from action, not interfering in the 
things happening around us, not being a part of the events around us and staying indifferent to them 
is like letting ourselves melt away, like ice turning to water’ (Gu¨len 2005, p. 96). Gu¨len does not 
analyse the dynamics of responsibility here. However, in not responding, not acting, it could be 
argued that we deny or disclaim responsibility for action and give that responsibility to others. In this 
sense responsibility, similar to Tawney’s (1930) view of power, is social, and will be taken up in some 
form or other by others if we do not claim it. Nasr (2006, p. 300) suggests a slight further 
development of responsibility as both individual and social, echoing Levinas (1989) and giving 
further point to Gu¨len’s view. He analyses verse 7: 172 of the Qur’an, where before creation God 
asks of human beings ‘Am I not your Lord? They said: Yea verily. We testify’. He argues that the verb 
in the case of the human response is plural. Hence, the positive response is not of an individual 
person, any more than it is a particular gender, but of all human beings. As Nasr puts it, ‘to be 
human is to have said yes, and we hear the mark of this affirmation deep within our beings’ (ibid.). 
Responsibility then is shared, a social response. This points up the enormous responsibility that is 
placed upon humankind as a whole, one that Nasr notes is all the more profound, precisely because 
humankind, unlike the rest of nature, is free to respond. This relational view of agency locates 
Gu¨len as a compatibilist (cf. Strawson 1982), i.e. recognising that a person can exercise agency even 
in a relational context that partly determines understanding and action. Such relationships do not 
totally determine the response of the person, not least because of his critical interpretive stance. 
Hence, for Gu¨len (2000, p. 152) even the concept of destiny, whereby God knows the end of all, 
does not ‘negate our free will’ (ibid).5  
4 A key virtue related to intentionality for Gu¨len is ikhlas, purity of heart, avoiding motivation based in 
individual reward, derived from Nursi’s writings (Michel 2005).  
5 This suggests that Gu¨len distinguishes pre-determinism and divine foreknowledge. God has foreknowledge 
of what we will do but still, in time, relates to us directly. There is not space to deal with this in detail here. 
However, it is not clear that Gu¨len resolves a major tension here. For instance, if God already knows how we 
will make decisions how can his relationship of love, which urges us to respond, be authentic? Can love 
actually be genuine if the lover already knows the outcome of the relationship? For the most part, however, 
Gu¨len (2000) simply stresses the ongoing relationship of love which sustains and challenges 
humankind. 
Liability  
The third mode of responsibility asks what are we responsible for, and, given the approach of Gu¨len 
to the accountability and attributability it is not surprising that Gu¨len should assert responsibility 
for everything. In reflecting on major Turkish figures, he writes: ‘Their responsibility is such that 
whatever enters an individual comprehension and conscious will power never remains outside of 
theirs: responsibility for the creation of events, nature and society, the past and the futures, the 
dead and the living, the young and the old, the literate and the illiterate, administration and 
security…. Everybody and everything’ (Gu¨len 2005, p. 95). This powerful statement involves several 
important elements. First, Gu¨len shows that much of his theology is what in the West might be 
viewed as practical or praxis theology, theology which is focused in and drawn from reflection on 
practice. Second, without systematically drawing out the implications, he begins to connect 
responsibility and consciousness. This is comparable to the New Testament gospels (Robinson 2008) 
where the responsibility for the beggar at the gate is connected to the consciousness of his presence 
there (Luke 19, pp. 19–31); suggesting that consciousness of the other always has an ethical not 
simply epistemological foundation. Third, Gu¨len shares with several writers in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, and with Bauman and Levinas, a strong sense of the suffering that goes with an awareness 
of universal responsibility. For Bauman ‘the moral self is always haunted by the suspicion that it is 
not moral enough’ (1989). No response can completely fulfil the call of the other, and thus the 
person can never be satisfied (Vicini 438).6 As Carroll observes (2007, p. 98) this also echoes more 
mystical and relational themes of Rumi that see pain as a condition of loving another, and thus being 
responsible for that other, ‘It is a yearning, a suffering, a palpitation of the heart, and a quivering 
consciousness that is never avoided as long as one is ‘‘in love’’ ’ (Gu¨len 2005, p. 98). Inevitably then 
there is a strong existential aspect to Gu¨len, providing a bridge even between him and writers such 
as (Sartre 2004).7 There are echoes in all this of the universal responsibility espoused by Dostoevsky 
in The Brothers Karamazov. Markel recognises his connection with everything, and says ‘everyone is 
really responsible to all men, for all men and for everything’ (1993, p. 41), a view later echoed by 
Father Zossima. Zossima, however, moves responsibility across from liability for consequences to 
liability for the sins of humankind, ‘as soon as you make yourself sincerely responsible for everything 
and for all men, you will see at once that it is really so, and that you are to blame everyone and for 
all things’ (1993, p. 78). For Gu¨len, however, this view would have major problems not least 
because it brings into question human agency. If we are to blame for everyone, then it is hard to see 
how personal moral responsibility could be taken seriously. Gu¨len is rather closer to Arendt. She 
defines humanity as the view ‘that in one form or another men must assume responsibility for all 
crimes committed by men and that all nations share the onus of evil committed by all others’ (1991, 
p. 282). 
 
6 For Bauman, like Levinas (1989), this is partly inevitable, because of the incommensurability of the other. 
Hence, the responsible person always has to discover the right response in and through the relationship. For 
Gu¨len the other is firstly God. This partly creates the impetus to always find what the next project is.  
7 Though Gu¨len’s universal responsibility is centred in hope.  
 
  
Here, Arendt does not necessarily mean strict moral liability for the sins of others, but more the 
sense that human kind must take responsibility for learning from those sins. Bauman (1989) suggests 
a context in which human beings tend to avoid responsibility.8 Hence, the need to continually work 
at responsibility for the social environment becomes inevitable, even if this can never be fully 
achieved. Gu¨len (Gu¨len 1990a, b, cf. 2009b), nonetheless, suggests that we will remain responsible 
even for unintended consequences. The Day of Judgement will reveal this. Inevitably, ‘Something 
will confront them from God, which they never reckoned’ (Qur’an, 39: 47). Hence, we remain 
responsible for more than the things we intend (despite the importance of intentionality), but not 
blameworthy, especially if, as Gu¨len (1990a, b) notes, we have been continually reflecting on our 
responsibility and developing the related consciousness of the social and physical environment in 
life.9 This directly relates personal responsibility to universal responsibility, taking responsibility 
beyond the codes of the narrow ethnic group. In turn, it relates personal responsibility directly to 
collective responsibility, partly because all are called to respond (see above) and partly because 
response can be more effective if responsibility for action is negotiated with other stakeholders.10 
Hence, Gu¨len (2004a, b) writes of ‘a shared responsibility’ to build a happier world. Such a view of 
responsibility, shared by Gu¨len and the peoples of the Book, has a limitless horizon (Gu¨len 
2005).11 In turn, this requires taking responsibility for developing consciousness of the social 
environment (ubudiyah) so that no ‘stakeholder’ is excluded (Gu¨len 2006). Once more this takes us 
back to a virtue-based approach to agency, comparable to Aquinas’s (1981) view of practical wisdom 
(prudentia).12 Prudentia precisely involves an attitude of existential openness: to the past 
(memoria), to the present, involving the capacity to be still and listen actively (docilitas), and to the 
future (solertia). In this sense, there is responsibility for our relationship to past present and future, 
which demands the practice of prudentia and also the critical thinking, focusing on reflection on the 
good, associated with Aristotle’s (1969) practical wisdom (phronesis). Hence, responsibility is directly 
related to the practice of the virtues. The stress on universal responsibility is reinforced by the stress 
on universal values and human rights (Gu¨len 2011; cf. Keles 2007) and hence on values which 
transcend exclusively religious values.  
Dialogue  
Underpinning all of these modes of responsibility for Gu¨len is dialogue. Indeed, dialogue is key to 
the practice of responsibility (Esposito and Yilmaz 2010; Pratt 2010), because it enables: the 
development of agency, consciousness of creation and the call to care for it, the capacity to give an 
account of thought and action, tolerance and the develoment of shared creative action. Though 
Gulen recognises the importance of interfaith dialogue (cf. Kung 1988), this moves beyond that to 
intercultural dialogue and dialogue focused in professional and civic practice (Vainoski-Mihai 2010).  
8 This could be viewed as a secular analogue (though not intended as such) of original sin. In this light, sin is 
seen in terms of avoidance or denial of responsibility (cf. the research of Milgram 2005, see also Zimbardo 
2007; Shanks 2012). 9 Nonetheless, responsibility for unintended consequences acts as strong motivation a 
continued renewal of consciousness of the social and physical environments. 10 Finch and Mason (1993) 
suggest that negotiation of responsibility is critical to the development of responsibility and even ethical 
identity. 11 This is precisely why Jesus exhorts his followers not restrict forgiveness to a prescribed 7 or even 
70 times 7 (Matthew 18:22). The Footnote 11 continued point of this saying is that once you have exhausted 
the rule, to forgive seven times, you still have to be responsible for the other. 12 Echoing Nursi’s focus on 
middle way of wisdom (Nursi 1995, Gu¨len 2009a, b). 
First, mutual dialogue enables the development of agency. It demands articulation of value and 
practice, which clarifies both what we think and do. Articulation, the development of narrative, 
becomes essential for reflection and learning, involving on-going hermeneutics (VainoskiMihai 
2010). Hence, this is the key vehicle for istihad, the on-going interpretation of the Qur’an. Pratt 
suggests that this is a ‘proper intellectual and spiritual struggle’ (Pratt 2010, p. 200), reflecting the 
richer view of agency in the light of Gu¨len’s holism and synoptic thinking. It is not simply around 
ideas, and with that the danger of moving into the defence of ideas. Huntington’s (1998) thesis of 
the clash of civilisations, i.e. that post-Cold War conflict will be focused in religious or cultural 
identities, is precisely located there. A holistic perspective, however, involves getting to know the 
self and other in relation to mutual plural culture, involving feelings as well as ideas, all focused in 
responsive action (Yilmaz 2002; Pratt 2010). This involves mutual challenge and mutual learning, 
with an output not of defence but action. This is what pleases God, not simply defending right 
thinking. Hence, such dialogue primarily involves genuine engagement with the other, as person, 
project or place, and not the assertion of the organisation’s location or identity in the public realm. 
All of these elements demand this involve not simply responsibility for critical thinking but also for 
the feelings that emerge around any felt sense of identity or around core values. This suggests that 
dialogue in all this is not simply a vehicle for thoughts, but is focused in ontology, a key means of 
developing the whole person. Second, mutual dialogue, through providing different perspectives on 
the social and physical environment tests and develops the participants’ awareness of these and 
their relationship to them. Entine (2002) argues that this is crucial in a business context. Third, 
dialogue is a key means of advancing accountability. In one sense this involves dialogue as providing 
genuine transparency (see Gu¨len on self interrogation 1990a, b; cf. O’Neill 2002), precisely because 
it requires all parties to give an account of their meaning and practice, and thus be held accountable 
for it. Fourth, whilst dialogue enables learning through examination of different perspectives and 
values Gu¨len also argues that it involves recognition of the sameness of the other, and thus, the 
development commitment to the self and the other (Graskemper 2007). It is not possible to pursue 
dialogue without giving space and time for it to develop, and this in turn demands a non-judgmental 
attitude. Commitment to the self and others is also essential if the potential critique of values and 
practice is to emerge from articulation and reflection. Hence, as Gu¨len stresses dialogue enables 
the development of tolerance and empathy (Vainoski-Mihai 2010). As Pratt (2010) notes, tolerance 
for Gu¨len is not passive acceptance but involves proactive engagement with the other-both seeing 
the other as part of humanity and as potential co-creator. Fifth, dialogue itself also sets up a 
continued accountability with those involved, enabling the development of shared responsibility 
(Gu¨len 2004a, b). Hence, Gu¨len can focus on a creative dialogue about society (Yilmaz 2002), 
extending to concern for peace and even for democracy itself (Keles 2007, p. 701). In all this, the 
Muslim is involved in a pluralistic society and is the bearer of plural identity, as citizen, professional, 
Muslim and so on (Esposito and Yilmaz 2010; Eldridge 2007, p. 534). The Muslim as citizen, for 
instance, is not to simply accept the legal framework in which he finds himself but must work 
towards democracy as an ideal of civil society (Esposito and Yilmaz 2010). Because it is relation-
centred Gu¨len’s view of dialogue includes forgiveness and reconciliation (Pratt 2010). Grinell (2010) 
suggests that all of this makes it easy for Gu¨len to be a ‘boarder transgressor’, to operate beyond 
boundaries. Sixth, dialogue leads to more effective action. Gu¨len (1995) suggests that we do not 
have to reach absolute agreement before working through the shared social issues such as 
ignorance, poverty and discrimination. On the contrary, these provide a shared area of concern and 
along with the shared values can be worked through regardless of differences, working through a 
negotiation of responsibility. Action also tests the accountability and commitment of those involved 
in the dialogue. Being accountable for actions also involves testing the actions against purpose and 
meaning. The actions themselves then become the basis for reflection on meaning. Such reflection 
then becomes the basis for the development of integrity, connecting the different voices and 
practice. The stress on mutuality and dialogue is strikingly different from two other key writers on 
universal responsibility, Levinas (1989) and Buber (1942). Levinas focuses on dialogue that is always 
asymmetrical (Werner 2010), i.e. never from equal positions such as both sides knowing the same or 
having the same resources or power. For Levinas, this is largely because he argues that the other 
who we are responsible for is never fully knowable, so that we are always moving out to them. 
Buber (1942) acknowledges some symmetricality in dialogue, but stresses less the rational sense of 
dialogue and more the deeper sense of personal awareness that precludes the need for critical 
rational dialogue. Gu¨len’s view of dialogue is far more robust. It is based in mutuality, recognising 
that there will be asymmetricality involved. In a sense, this is inevitable given the stress on handling 
plurality in dialogue. All the parties will have different resources and needs. Against Levinas, Gu¨len’s 
view of responsibility is focused in creative action and hence in the embodiment of responsibility. 
Far from a continual journey towards the other this suggests a shared journey on which the other is 
discovered through intentional action. It is the imperative of action that moves dialogue forward. 
Against Buber, Gu¨len’s view of dialogue and responsibility precisely demands rational articulation. 
This is both at the heart of accountability, important for the expression of respect or care, and key to 
the development of shared responsibility. In both cases responsibility takes dialogue out of the 
simple dyadic relationship. It is always a function of plurality. Any immediate dialogue is connected 
to dialogue in a wider social context and has implications for related other dialogues. The implication 
of Gu¨len’s position is that responsibility should empower all involved to contribute most effectively 
to creative action. That creative action takes Gu¨len back to the foundation of accountability to the 
creator, showing the three modes of responsibility as intimately connected. Such cooperation also 
opens up a mutual dialogue and negotiation that enables effective response to the needs of the 
social and physical environment. Importantly, the very act of negotiation develops the shared sense 
of moral meaning, responsibility and ethical identity, which in turn establishes identity and worth (cf. 
Finch and Mason 1993, who show a similar dynamic in families). This is reinforced by the dynamic of 
hizmet and co-creation. In effect, the shared responsibility is embodied in action, and the 
negotiation of responsibility extends the imagination and develops creativity. It shows what is 
possible, especially where responsibility is shared, and so increases the capacity to respond. Directly 
connected to the development of responsibility through dialogue is the practice of virtues, such as 
phronesis. Gu¨len also offers what is characterised in Christian terms as theological virtues, not least 
hope (Saritoprak 2011). The practice of shared responsibility, through action centred dialogue, 
generates this virtue through the development both of agency and practical pathways (cf. Robinson 
2008). This also works through issues of power and responsibility. Negotiation involves working with 
stakeholders that have different levels of power, personally and institutionally, and involves 
recognition of limitations, different possibilities through the increasing options, and empowerment 
of those involved. Gu¨len’s stress on ongoing reflection, dialogue, interpretation, innovative 
thinking, critical rationality and renewal (tajdid) places him firmly in the Islamic tradition of 
intellectual enquiry, including figures such as Sayyid Ahmed, Muhammad Iqbal, and Muhammad 
Abduh (Moosa 2003, p. 117). On-going ijtihad is not simply an add-on to theological thinking, but 
rather a necessary element of responsibility centred dialogue. His Nursi inspired stress on 
consciousness, the use of science, openness to truth outside strict revelation, and service in action 
(Vicini 2007; Eldridge 2007) take him also firmly into the arena of public discourse. This is partly 
because of his stress on spirituality, i.e. the livedness or praxis of responsibility rather than simply its 
theology (cf. Vicini 2007).13 Different disciplines and cultures can thus see what he means in action 
and are engaged in dialogue about action. This enables him to development a movement which, as 
noted above, is quite distinct from traditional Sufi tariqa. Hence, the movement looks to maintain 
Islamic tradition, focused in the Qur’an, but enabling openness dialogue with plurality inside and 
outside Islam. His stress on science as a key means of discovering truth about creation and on 
universal values and principles further enhances the need for dialogue (Eldridge 2007). Indeed, 
interdisciplinary, conceptual, intercultural, international, and interfaith dialogue become critical, 
because Gu¨len aims to hold together both tradition and innovation. This is further developed by the 
focus on responding to the wider needs of society, including addressing, poverty, ignorance and 
disunity (Gu¨rbu¨z 2007). Hence, he can argue for democracy as a core value alongside human rights 
(Keles 2007).14  
Corporate Responsibility  
The dynamic of this view of responsibility is quite distinct from much work and practice in corporate 
responsibility. Gu¨len’s approach to responsibility is certainly focused in stakeholder relations (cf. 
Beekun and Badawi 2005). However, it is not based in instrumental or descriptive theories (Heath 
and Norman 2004). Moreover, his more normative stance is less concerned with determining how 
obligations to stakeholders might differ or be fulfilled but more about how the Muslim 
businessperson can respond with others to the wider needs of the social and physical environment. 
The stress on universal responsibility and creative service is the starting point from which action 
flows. First, recent on-going research with Gu¨len businessmen in Istanbul has suggested three 
things so far.15 The model of responsibility in business is largely focused in small to medium 
businesses. One of the exceptions I will examine below. Also, the business leaders in a local area 
meet on a weekly basis and discuss issues about responsibility and how they might exercise that in 
relation to different needs. The practice of responsibility is focused in critical dialogue which 
genuinely tests ideas and practice, and maximising outcomes through cooperation with each other 
and different agencies. I will note below the key focuses. Finally, they do not view stakeholders as 
groups whose interests have to be balanced with others, but are rather concerned how stakeholders 
can work together to fulfil responsibility to the wider environment.16  
13 Hence Gu¨len’s capacity to relate to an existentialist position whilst also critiquing the underlying 
philosophy. 14 It might be argued that just as Bauman argues for aporia at the centre of ethics Gu¨len sets up 
a parallel series of values and principles which cannot be simplistically assimilated. The only way to work 
through tradition and universal principles is precisely through dialogue and action. 15 Research being carried 
by the author into the understanding and practice of responsiblity in the Hizmet Movement. 16 Many viewed 
themselves as stakeholders in creation. 
 
 
 One business man referred to his eighteen employees as being part of his extended family, and of 
his desire to empower them in their different relationships at home and work. This included offering 
interest free loans for housing. Such empowerment he took to be both good for business and good 
in itself. Second, Gu¨len’s dynamic then suggests the development of shared responsibility, not 
simply the recognition and congruence of shared interests (cf. Porter and Kramer 2011). The stress 
on universal responsibility and creative service is the starting point. In that light, stakeholders are 
not passive recipients, but active participants in responsible practice which seeks to respond to the 
wider environments. This demands that business practice is centred in dialogue and the practice of 
all three modes of responsibility. It leads to the negotiation of responsibility, exemplified in the way 
that businesses develop decisions around funding the work of the Hizmet Movement. Much of this 
work is focused not in the development of the Movement, as such, but rather in response to the 
three evils of ignorance, poverty and disunity. Hence, the focus of shared responsibility is in the 
development of education, economic development, healthcare, and peacebuilding, pointing to a 
social responsibility that both transcends interest, even shared interest, transcends narrow religious 
aims, and is part of being a business person and citizen (Gu¨rbu¨z 2007). The practice of corporate 
responsibility in the Hizmet Movement has focused more on the development of education than on 
any other area. The movement has been responsible for the founding and development of over 500 
schools worldwide. These schools have not been ‘Islamic’, in the sense of teaching Islamic values. On 
the contrary, the pupils have been from many different religions and cultures, and the education has 
focused on educational excellence, universal values, democracy and critical dialogue. The schools 
are partly funded by fees, but depend mostly by the resources of businessmen working together 
often with Gu¨len NGOs. The dynamic, as described by Uygur (2007), is of the business leaders 
coming together and reflecting on the educational needs in their area and also globally. From that 
basis they determine what their funding priorities will be. This way of ‘doing’ corporate responsibility 
then is essentially dialogic and cooperative. Moreover, the focus on education clearly looks to the 
response to the transcendent call to act as co-creators, in effect being responsible for the future of 
responsibility through education which itself focuses on agency, accountability, character and 
citizenship. Third, the Gu¨len approach challenges the liberal view of Friedman (1983) and Sternberg 
(2000) of accountability. They base responsibility simply in a narrow framework of accountability, 
focused on the relationship between executive and owner. Hence, the purpose of business is 
narrowly defined as increasing profits for the owner, within a legal framework. Gu¨len’s more 
encompassing sense of purpose and proactive responsibility challenges their anthropology 
(individualistic persons), and their limited view of enterprise. Moreover, it questions the assumption 
(cf. Sternberg 2000) that a business leader cannot hold together multiple responsibilities. On the 
contrary, Gu¨len suggests an anthropology built on plurality, and managing plural identity (Esposito 
and Yilmaz 2010). As a Turkish orthodox Muslim, from the Sufi tradition, and an advocate EU 
membership Gu¨len himself embodies this.17  
17 Taylor (1989) refers to persons as plural, and the same is true of any organisation, including cultural, 
religious, organisational, civic, national and super national aspects (Brown 2005). 
 
 
Each of these involves relationships for which the firm and the individual are responsible. This sets 
up a model of multiple responsibility, which is akin to the traditional model of professions (cf. 
Khurana and Nohria 2008; cf. also Pettit 2007) as responsible for and to colleagues, and the 
profession, and the client, and society as a whole, focused in core moral and pre-moral goods such 
as justice or health. Gu¨len sets up this model of plural responsibility in the context of Islam, 
enabling him to show why Islam shares responsibility for public life, without embracing theocracy.18 
Hence, Vicini (2007, p. 441) notes that in the stress on action, and therefore the public nature of the 
Islamic responsiveness, Gu¨len sees Muslims as also citizens, able to share responsibility for social 
debate and practice. Importantly, this suggests that dialogue is never simply bi-partite. As I noted 
above, any open dialogue links to and is carried on in different ways with many different dialogues 
(see also Robinson and Smith 2014). Gu¨len’s perspective on responsibility allows him both to accept 
the free-market framework of business and develop a strong social responsibility strategy, worked 
through the Hizmet movement. In the first of these, business is responsible for getting its job done, 
including the creation of wealth. This looks similar to Michael Novak’s view of the Catholic Work 
Ethic, with the market place as a positive force for good and even the creation of community (Novak 
1990). For Gu¨len, there is also a moral framework. This has to place the activity of wealth creation 
into a wider social context. Even basic transactions must be submitted to God’s law, ‘By doing so, 
Muslims submit to God’s decree in that particular matter and so transcend their own worldly 
preferences. For example, Muslim merchants must inform their customers of any defect in the 
merchandise. While this may lower or even cancel the resulting profit, [they] will have the 
satisfaction of obeying God and not serving their own desires’ (Gu¨len 2000, p. 29). The complexity 
and global context of this approach to responsibility emerges in relation to peacebuilding and civil 
society (Uygur 2007). The focus of corporate responsibility extends both through funding education 
and disaster relief NGOs (such as Kimse Yok Mu- Is there anybody there?- cf. Michel 2008) to areas 
of conflict and post-conflict need. In Kurdistan, South East Turkey, Indonesia, the Philippines, for 
instance, Islamic businesses have founded many schools, a university, and directly invested in 
enterprise (Kalyoncu 2010; Osman 2007; Michel 2003). Business is thus involved in the development 
of post-conflict civil society and the economy. Many transnational corporations include the need to 
respect human rights as part of their corporate responsibility policy (Robinson and Dowson 2012). 
The Gu¨len practice goes beyond that to the development of civil society and democracy, a concern 
that is driven through cooperation between small and medium businesses and between business 
and other agents in society, linking with other networks (cf. Lederach 2005, with his stress on the 
importance of the social web to peacebuilding). The negotiation of responsibility inevitably takes the 
work well beyond a narrow view of religion. The development of a school in an area of conflict, for 
instance (Uygur 2007), moves the centre of concern away from evangelism to response to need, and 
in turn involves other stakeholders to become involved as cocreators in forming social capital and 
the development of peace (cf. Maak 2007). One Philippine school, for instance, was made up of 
equal numbers of students from both sides of the conflict even before the end of the conflict (Michel 
2003). 
18 Several Turkish businessmen focused on Gu¨len’s idea of concentric circles of responsibility (1991, derived 
from Nursi). These noted different levels of obligation, from that owed to God to that owed to the world. 
Importantly, though all had to be recognised and responded to in appropriate action. 
 
 The practice of responsibility then is not business centred but response centred, with business as a 
stakeholder in creation, focusing on its enterprise and how universal responsibility might be fulfilled, 
in the light of limitations and possibilities. Reporting responsibility then is less about hitting 
responsibility targets and more around narratives that embody intentional creativity. Media 
Corporations Despite the small to medium nature of businesses associated with the Hizmet 
Movement there are good examples of larger institutions which focus on the Gu¨len’s view of 
responsibility. The media outlets of the Hizmet Movement, in particular, give a good example of how 
responsible dialogue is enabled in practice. The outlets include television channels, publishing 
outlets, and newspapers. Behind many of these projects is the Writers and Journalists Foundation, a 
not-for-profit organisation which is part of the Movement and focuses on the development 
interfaith and inter-cultural dialogue. Zaman Daily is a prime example of a newspaper in this area. It 
offers both a focus of dialogue and perhaps more importantly the conditions for dialogue. Kerim 
Balci has suggested that there are five key principles embodied in the Zaman Media group.19 The 
principles are not a written code of conduct, but are drawn from practice by Balci. These are: 1. 
Good news is also good news 2. No sensationalism 3. No denigration, no defamation 4. Text-
intensivity 5. Being in equal closeness to all the political parties. Strikingly, these do not speak 
directly of responsibility. However, they provide a context for the responsibility of journalism 
through enabling on-going dialogue. The first principle partly is focused in the Turkish history where 
the press had practised mainly pejorative journalism, reflecting a negative, pessimistic view of 
human nature, society, and the state and God. The principle demands a clear awareness of the social 
and physical environment, an appreciation of the positive aspects of creation, and the capacity to 
communicate good news, and thus hope. The second principle refines the first, noting that 
sensationalist journalism tends to focus not on data so much as entertaining the reader, often 
through causing pain of others. Hence, if there is news of violence, then it should be accompanied by 
analysis and possible solutions. Both of these principles have their roots in Sufi tradition. Not only is 
the universe created in the best possible way, but also depiction of the world should also be in a 
good way. An event and its story are two distinct elements of reality, each with distinct moral value, 
not least because the depiction can affect responses to the story. In 2001, it was decided to find 
criteria of measuring how well the story was told. This led, for example, to the use of full verbal 
sentences in headlines so that they were not ambiguous, and avoiding large character headlines that 
imply sensation. If the headline in itself is not enough to clearly state the content of the news item, 
then use is made of extra spot lines to explain the reader rapidly the content of the article. This goes 
against the UK journalistic ‘convention’ that headlines should always be read with the article. The 
third principle is partly about ensuring no denigration of groups or individuals, but also about 
ensuring that the voices of different ethnic, religious groups and other groups are heard in the article 
(through hiring columnists from different cultural and intellectual perspectives). Again this reflects 
the importance of hearing different narratives and how they relate to the story. The effect is to hold 
together narrative, narrator and events. In other words, journalism begins to move beyond the 
simply reporting of events to an awareness and appreciation of different narratives and the 
narrators themselves and how they relate the story and the wider environments. 
19 I am grateful Kerim Balci formerly of the Turkish Review and now Zaman, who shared these with me on a 
research trip to Istanbul in May 2013, 
In turn, this sharpens the dialogue and, with that, sharpens the understanding of the story itself, and 
the related data. The fourth principle begins to focus further on the means of communication. 
Zaman Daily is text intensive. This means more space for lengthy, analytical pieces often supplied by 
academics and thus setting up more different perspectives. More text needs more time for the 
readers to engage with the discourse. This in turn leads to the development of a stabilised 
readership (further committed through subscription), which begins also to contribute to the debate 
and dialogue. Zaman Daily also uses a high Turkish in the search for a richer vocabulary and more 
rigorous articulation of ideas. Dialogue, and with that the development of responsibility, requires a 
clarity and rigour which tests the narrative. The final principle is of political disinterestedness (core 
to any professional ethics), in the sense of equal distance from all political parties. This does not 
preclude taking views of political policies, not least support for transparent governance, democracy, 
minority rights, and responsible capitalism. Key to this stance is the capacity to challenge all parties 
and interests, both in political and civil society, thus encouraging further dialogue. In short then, the 
media is a good example of Gu¨len’s dialogue focus in practice, providing a framework for dialogue, 
and supporting mutual responsibility. It develops agency, the capacity to give an account and test 
narratives, listening skills and with that empathy, a commitment to the community of dialogue, and 
a preparedness to look at different options. With that comes the development of accountability and 
a preparedness to learn.20 Such dialogue builds a practice which transcends interest or ideology. In 
effect, this is the practice of practical wisdom (phronesis), reflection on the good of any practice, 
focused in dialogue.  
Conclusions  
Gu¨len’s approach to responsibility is holistic and connective. It holds together three different 
modes of responsibility, accountability, moral agency and action-centred liability. Accountability 
provides an effective ethical framework which fuels response to the call of the other. Moral agency 
holds together the affective, cognitive and social aspects of the person and organisation, offering a 
critical perspective on each of these. Shared universal responsibility focuses on intentional action 
which is a function of critical dialogue and negotiation. All this provides an approach to responsibility 
which integrates virtues and universal principles, focused in relationality and rationality. It also 
provides a way of integrating ethics, CSR and sustainability, moving beyond CSR which is increasingly 
dominated by measurements and targets, because it is more concerned about culture, character and 
creative practice-hence the integrated practice of responsibility. In all this, external regulation is less 
important than accountability based in the call of the other and working with stakeholders.21 This 
approach provides a means of holding together different aspects of responsibility, personal and 
collective, corporate and civic, not least because its focus transcends narrow interest in any of these 
areas. Gu¨len, of course, provides an example of a religious approach and I offer this recounting of it 
not as fully worked through framework. The approach inevitably has limitations which would have to 
be addressed.  
20 The authenticity of such dialogue was tested by the 2010 incident where a flotilla of ships tried to break the 
Gaza Blockade to provide aid to the Palestinians (supported by Zaman Daily), leading to conflict and several 
deaths. Gu¨len himself unusually made a public comment on this, arguing it was misguided (Lauria 2010). The 
result was dialogue between Zaman Daily and Gu¨len himself at several levels, reflecting also a wider dialogue 
between Turkish Muslim NGOs involved in the flotilla and Gu¨len. 21 In this sense Gu¨len extends King’s call to 
see stakeholder involvement as key to co-regulation of governance (King 2009).  
For instance, the focus on democracy will inevitably raise questions about equality, and, with that, 
issues about gender equality in the workplace. Also, the Hizmet Movement ably develops dialogue 
across many fronts, but might develop more effectively such dialogue and action with non-Islamic 
NGOs in civil society. However, the approach of Gu¨len precisely doesn’t presume perfection but 
rather continual dialogic reinterpretation, both of the Qur’an and of action, with the first step of 
accepting responsibility and then working through how that might be embodied in service. This 
provides the basis for a more proactive view of corporate responsibility, linked to the common good. 
And because of its capacity to address multiple narratives, with related responsibilities, it embodies 
a means of including religion in that public dialogue, and a means of engaging the multiple narratives 
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